What is Given in Experience ? A Review of Isabelle Stengers ‘Penser avec Whitehead’ by Latour, Bruno
  
 
 
 
What Is Given in Experience? 
Bruno Latour 
Every synthesis begins “anew” and has to be taken up from the start as if for the first 
time. 
—Isabelle Stengers, Penser avec Whitehead: Une libre et sauvage creation de 
concepts 
 
It could be one of those little games journalists play on television talk shows 
about books: “Who was the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century whose name 
begins with W?” Most learned people in America would answer “Wittgenstein.” Sorry. 
The right answer is “Whitehead”—another philosopher whose name begins with W, to 
be sure, but one who is vastly more daring, and also, unfortunately, much less studied. 
Among his many misfortunes, Whitehead had the very bad one of provoking too much 
interest among theologians and too little among epistemologists. His reputation in 
America is thus skewed toward his theological innovations to the detriment of his 
epistemological theories. He also suffers from the terrible stigma of having indulged in 
metaphysics, something one is no longer supposed to do after the edicts of the first “W,” 
even though those who think that metaphysics is passé know usually much less science 
than Whitehead and swallow—without an ounce of criticism—hook, line, and sinker the 
entirety of metaphysical beliefs about nature that one can easily derive by lumping 
together the least-common-denominator views of geneticists and so-called cognitive 
scientists. As Isabelle Stengers says in her recently published masterpiece about 
Whitehead, “critical consciousness admits so many things without criticizing them” (74).  
What makes Stengers’s book, Penser avec Whitehead—in English, “to think with 
Whitehead”—such an important work for Anglo-American philosophy is that in it the 
greatest philosopher of the twentieth century is finally studied in great detail by someone 
who is one of the most innovative philosophers of science of the present time. Now we 
finally have, in other words, after years of embarrassed commentaries in which people 
had eulogized Whitehead’s God and disparaged Whitehead’s science, a book in which 
Whitehead’s science and Whitehead’s God are each given their rightful place. This 
development is not going to put process theology on a new footing. After having worked 
for years on the physics of time with Ilya Prigogine,1 and then after having written her 
seven-volume treatise laying out her own version of Cosmopolitics,2 Stengers has 
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dedicated 572 pages to her favorite philosopher, retranslating herself many pages of this 
most difficult of authors for the sake of her analysis in French.3 
For people who have read for years both Stengers and Whitehead, the prospect 
of reading the prose of the first commenting on the prose of the second might be 
somewhat daunting. And yet, one gets exactly the opposite result: Stengers illuminates 
the most obscure passages of Whitehead in a style that is supple, often witty, always 
generous. So readers should not be put off by the surprising subtitle, which Stengers 
actually borrowed from Deleuze: there is nothing “wild” in this book, except as that 
word might be used to characterize the freedom and invention of the author. Of those 
virtues the book is stuffed full.4 
Following Whitehead, Stengers has been able to turn around many of the 
metaphors usually borrowed from critical thinking: “To think with Whitehead today 
means to sign on in advance to an adventure that will leave none of the terms we 
normally use as they were, even though none will be undermined or summarily 
denounced as a carrier of illusion” (24). 
Whitehead is thoroughly put to the test here, and yet I have no doubt that, had 
he lived, Deleuze would have celebrated this book as a major event in the geopolitics of 
philosophy: a great but neglected Anglo-American is reimported into France through 
Belgium, and the event is taken as the occasion to reinterpret pragmatism, Bergsonism, 
and empiricism. What a wonder! What an interesting ecological “inter-capture”! 
Although the book is a close reading, in chronological order, of the major books 
of Whitehead, and although it makes good use of the body of existing scholarship, it 
does not simply try to explain or popularize the history of Whitehead’s thought. As the 
title indicates so well, the aim is to think with Whitehead. Because she is herself a 
philosopher of science who has explored minutely many of the same fields as 
Whitehead—chemistry, physics, Darwinism, ethology, and psychology (but not 
mathematics nor logic, although she takes very seriously the fact that Whitehead thinks 
as a mathematician)—Stengers’s book can be seen as an effort to test out Whitehead’s 
most daring concepts on new materials and in new examples. But contrary to the rather 
cavalier way in which Whitehead treats his own predecessors, Stengers is very precise 
and follows with great attention Whitehead’s own hunches. Have no doubt: when we 
read this book, we are thinking with Stengers and with Whitehead all along; we are not 
thinking with Whitehead about what is on Stengers’s mind. 
 
The whole book turns around the most arduous question of Whitehead, without 
making any attempt either to avoid the difficulties or to obfuscate his philosophy by 
bringing in new irrelevant conundrums. The basic question is to decide whether or not 
empiricism can be renewed so that “what is given in experience” is not simplified too 
much. Against the tradition inaugurated by Locke and Descartes, then pushed to the 
limits by Kant, until it was terminated by William James, Whitehead offers another role 
for the object of study to play: “The object [for him] is neither the judge of our 
production nor the product of our judgments” (93).5 
What has been least critically considered by the philosophical tradition, and 
especially by the anti-metaphysical one, is the feature of Western thought that occupied 
Whitehead for most of his career, what he calls “the bifurcation of nature,” that is to 
say, the strange and fully modernist divide between primary and secondary qualities.6 
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Bifurcate is a strange and awkward word, strange to the tongue and ear, but what it 
betokens is something even worse for our thinking. Bifurcation is what happens 
whenever we think the world is divided into two sets of things: one which is composed of 
the fundamental constituents of the universe—invisible to the eyes, known to science, 
real and yet valueless—and the other which is constituted of what the mind has to add 
to the basic building blocks of the world in order to make sense of them. Those “psychic 
additions,” as Whitehead calls them, are parts of common sense, to be sure, but they are 
unfortunately of no use to science, since they have no reality, even though they are the 
stuff out of which dreams and values are made.7 
If I could summarize Stengers’s version of Whitehead by a sort of syllogism, it 
could be the following one: modernist philosophy of science implies a bifurcation of 
nature into objects having primary and secondary qualities. However, if nature really is 
bifurcated, no living organism would be possible, since being an organism means being 
the sort of thing whose primary and secondary qualities—if they did exist—are endlessly 
blurred. Since we are organisms surrounded by many other organisms, nature has not 
bifurcated. Corollary: if nature has never bifurcated in the way philosophy has implied 
since the time of Locke, what sort of metaphysics should be devised that would pay full 
justice to the concrete and obstinate existence of organisms? The consequence of 
considering this question is radical indeed: “The question of what is an object and thus 
what is an abstraction must belong, if nature is not allowed to bifurcate, to nature and 
not to knowledge only” (95; my emphasis). 
Hence the roughly three equal parts of the book (although Stengers divides her 
book in two): How to overcome the bifurcation of nature? What is an organism of a 
creative sort? What sort of strange God is implied for this new philosophical business? 
 
“Organism” is not, of course, a scientific concept. It is, rather, the metaphysical 
alternative to the notion of substance. In the long philosophical tradition, substance is 
what endures by itself and is expressed by attributes. Organisms, on the other hand, 
have to pay the full price of their duration by repeating and sometimes reproducing 
themselves, that is, also risking themselves, through interaction with the other things that 
make them exist. Being attentive to any one thing leads us to consider so many others 
just to understand what they are, that is, how they remain in existence.8 This is, in a 
way, a basic tenet of pragmatism, but extended very far, as far as is necessary to hold 
organisms in existence.9 In a way that is much truer than for Bergson, one could say 
that Whitehead was the first philosopher to take Darwin’s discoveries as seriously as 
those of Newton or Einstein: “The problem of Whitehead was to avoid wheeling 
metaphysics in to make it play the sad role of rendering thinkable what the bifurcation 
of nature has rendered unintelligible: a nature without sound, nor odor that a mind 
would hastily clothe with sound and odor” (127). 
In this way, Whitehead undid what Kant had done by a “beautiful and perverse 
stroke that reveals exactly the sort of power Whitehead wants to forbid philosophy to 
play: the power to transform a refusal to think things through, and to do so in a 
paradoxical way that is supposed to reveal the limits of thought” (130). 
This does not mean that Stengers is going to champion Whitehead’s attempts to 
account for Einstein’s relativity, quantum physics, and Darwinian evolutionary theory 
by gathering new and better proofs borrowed from her own experience of 
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contemporary science—for instance, by drawing on her long association with Prigogine. 
No, one has to recognize that Whitehead’s attempts at rethinking the science of his time 
have been so many bets waged in the thirties that have not yielded any gain. This proves 
nothing for or against them: history is not finished, nor is the real rational. It is the 
philosophical import of those attempts that Stengers wants to fathom. Whitehead’s 
interpretations of the twentieth-century discoveries have shown that there exist many 
other ways to take seriously “what is given in experience.” Stengers’s version of 
Whitehead offers not another critique of empiricism but, on the contrary, another way 
to get at experience, a new attempt to open what could be called a second empiricism. 
Naturally, in the same historical venture, phenomenologists, too, had tried to 
enrich experience, and so had the strangest of all phenomenologists, namely, Martin 
Heidegger. Yes, but they abandoned science to its bifurcating ways and enriched only 
the realm of the lived experience where human intentionality operates. Although this 
was certainly a wonderful thing to accomplish, it made no difference to our 
understanding of the cosmos, and for Whitehead it is the cosmos that is the given for 
human experience, not just what is the result of human intentionality and the “lived” 
world. But is this not what Bergson had tried to analyze as well? The problem is that 
Bergson could not reintroduce duration without having to criticize the sciences for their 
sad intoxication with space, geometry, and mastery of technology. What Bergson gained 
by extending his analyses to time was unfortunately paid for by an immense loss—the 
ability of science to account for the experience of the cosmos. Is this not, then, what 
pragmatists had tried to achieve? To be sure, James is one of the heroes of Whitehead’s 
story, but if we have to recognize that James closed the parenthesis opened by Locke, we 
must also see that he did not offer an alternative, since, here again, as with Bergson, 
rationalism is not given its full due. As to the other “W” and those who have totally 
abandoned cosmology and metaphysics in order to retreat into language, they should 
remain where they are and where they belong: silent in the shelter of the various 
university campuses where they reside. 
By taking seriously Whitehead’s attempt at embracing what science tells us about 
experience when it is not limited simply to Lockean empiricism, Stengers offers a route 
completely different from that offered by critical theory, social constructivism, or 
deconstruction. Against all hermeneutics, she shows that the key notion of 
“interpretation” directs our attention not to the human mind, but, so to speak, back to 
the world. It is the world itself that is “open to interpretation,” not because of the 
weakness of our limited mind but because of the world’s own activities. 
One of the key discoveries of Stengers’s Whitehead is that an emphasis on 
perspective, far from celebrating the point of view that a given subject “has on” some 
state of affairs, is rather a telling witness of what perception offers to the living organism. 
In a long and admirable commentary on The Concept of Nature—a terribly difficult 
book she renders crystal clear (well, with some remaining calcifications . . . )—she 
reveals that Whitehead overcame the obsession with perception by going forward 
toward the world in its determination and indeterminacy instead of backward toward 
the knowing subject, as is so often the case, in order to raise the trite question of how we 
are sure of what we know. Thus, perspective is no longer a proof of subjectivity but a 
proof of the grasp of reality of what Whitehead calls “the passage of nature”: “The 
passage is neutral, the point of view does not belong to you, except that you occupy it, 
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but it is much more accurately described as what keeps you busy rather than what you 
own” (82). There are many more interesting questions to ask about science than that of 
its degree of certainty. 
Hence the two crucial results for the second empiricism: (a) Perception is not 
what stops access to things and directs attention to the mind, to its activity and to its 
“additions.” Rather, perception is what marks the event and the beginning of an 
attention directed toward everything else that has been present in perception and that 
cannot be eliminated. (b) Perception refers back to a point of view, a locus, but this point 
of view is the least relativist and the least subjective element, since it is what is seized and 
grasped by the panorama being embraced. The results of these two different kinds of 
perception are very different: one destroys objectivism, the other destroys subjectivism; 
although the first keeps everything the sciences might add to experience, the other keeps 
everything that counts in the localization and incarnation of some experimenting 
organism. 
To avoid the bifurcation of nature, there was only one thing that needed to be 
added, an understanding of the event of the grasping itself by science as being 
something that happens not only in the world but to the world. But to be able to succeed 
in this undertaking, Whitehead has literally to move heaven and earth, that is, to 
completely redo cosmology”: “Neither nature nor mind is in command” (127). When 
commenting upon the discovery of the nature of the atom as grasped by chemistry and 
physics, Stengers explains, “These atoms are in no way an answer to the question of 
deciding what pertains to ‘our’ projection and what pertains to nature. They are an 
answer to the type of attention associated with the experimental effort” (116). 
Science has been the captive for much too long of theories of knowledge. This is 
the most difficult and crucial point in Stengers’s interpretation of Whitehead: at one and 
the same time, the invention of the scientific object, “independent of perception,” can 
be used to celebrate a new grasp of nature that intensifies what nature is made of (this is 
Whitehead’s second empiricism) or to completely disqualify the poetic and subjective 
world of lived human experience (the first empiricism). Hence the example of a butterfly 
detecting a flower: 
It is the proper ambition of the chemist to be able to define, then to 
synthesize an “object” common to humans and to butterflies, a molecule 
whose presence plays a determining role both in what we call “odor” and 
for the detection of which the flight of the butterfly bears witness. Such a 
success would not have had any meaning independently of the physical 
object, the “odorant flower” from which perfume makers have long 
learned to extract and conserve its “active principle.”  
. . . The scientific object implies the existence of the physical object, even 
when it declares itself independent from the perceiving event. (118) 
Thus, scientific activity is freed from the rather absurd choice of having to 
choose between “being of this world” and “being of another world.” Rather, science 
adds its knowledge to the world, folding itself, so to speak, into it one more time. 
Again and again in the first and second part of the book, Stengers comes back to 
this total renewal of the empiricist scene in agonizing details, but she follows carefully 
Whitehead’s own agonizing path. If Whitehead is difficult—if Stengers is sometimes 
difficult, too—it is because they both have to climb back up a steeper slope than the one 
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Sisyphus had to ascend, and with a heavier load than he had, too. What happens to all 
our accounts of the world when we no longer play the game of the eliminativists who 
split the world into primary and secondary qualities? The objects of science are no 
longer placed behind the feelings of, for instance, poetry, but are implicated, folded into 
them. The singing bird and the “material” birds are no longer split into two: “The bird 
as a living being implies that what should come to the fore in science [is] the question of 
what is the order of nature for which this bird, as an organism, bears witness and also 
what is the nature for the continuation of which this bird, as far as it possesses habits, is 
betting” (129; my emphases). 
This does not mean that the biologist tries to somehow get beneath the living 
bird and to forget its singing to figure out how the bird employs the cold machinery that 
makes it sing. It means, as in the butterfly story, that it is because the bird endures in its 
existence that another interpretation, proper to the biologist interested in the extent of 
this duration, can be made. In this new version, biologists add their own grain of salt to 
the broth—but only as long as there is a bird. The ethnologist is not destroying the 
romantic, superficial, and superfluous poetry of the singing bird by substituting for them 
cold facts. She is allowed by the poet to look for what in the bird responds when 
interrogated in another way. Yes, Whitehead offers a correspondence theory of truth, 
and a very “realist” one at that, but one in which the tired old word co-respond gains 
fresh meaning. For we must understand that the bird is an organism that bets on life, 
and so too is the inquiring scientist.10 
Such is the real mechanism devised by Whitehead to block bifurcation. The 
same scientific results might be celebrated because their successes led to the elimination 
of all the other ingredients of the cosmos—“thus you are wrong to think there is 
anything else in the world of nature”—or because they drew attention to new stabilizing 
entities (such as the atom or the synthesized flavor) that are also present in the world of 
nature. Realism can be achieved much better by giving up the unification of the concept 
of nature. And even when nature is unified, no one can use it to condemn its other 
ingredients—ingression being one of the Whitehead’s most technical terms. The big 
problem, of course, is that the epistemological fundamentalists have rewritten history to 
change the successes of some sciences into a winner-takes-all game, a sort of 
philosophical equivalent of a military all-terrain Jeep that can overcome some bumps 
and climb some hills and is turned into the Little Engine that Could Climb Every 
Mountain: “The scientific object became no longer the answer to the experimental 
grasp, but an all purpose explanation of what we perceive in general even in the absence 
of any perception” (119). 
Needless to say, for science students—philosophers, historians, or sociologists of 
science—this argument provided an extraordinary resource to get out of the tired old 
drama of realism versus relativism that has occupied so many of us for so long.11 No one 
is at once more relativist than Whitehead—even an atom is a point of view—and more 
realist—even an atom is a point of view! 
According to Stengers’s portrait, only Whitehead went far enough to explain 
why the first empiricism did not respect the cosmological and rationalist dimensions of 
the sciences. And contrary to all of his predecessors—Kant and Hegel—and 
contemporaries—Bergson, James, Husserl, and, of course, Heidegger—he did not try to 
impose limits to science, to overcome their limits, to feed on their weaknesses, but added 
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another dimension to them. (In general, Whitehead ignores negativity or even criticisms 
so totally that he keeps adding, including to his own texts, at the last minute, without 
even bothering to cancel out his own earlier thoughts—“adjunctions,” Stengers calls 
them). Whitehead always digs further into what is given by the scientific activity and 
what is learned about the world in addition to what scientists say about their own work. 
What remains incomprehensible is why this lesson has been ignored—or why it 
has degenerated into a vague process theology that has been developed in total 
ignorance of what the sciences did to the world. It is Stengers’s essential contribution to 
have given us back the full lesson of Whitehead’s books after three-quarters of a century 
in which they were abandoned. 
 
The second third of the book aims at understanding what on earth Whitehead 
could have meant by such a notion of organism. Against the artificial conundrums of the 
mind-body problem, which are themselves the consequence of the bifurcation of nature, 
Whitehead reveals that if we humans are organisms, then a completely different 
cosmology is implied. As I have said, an organism can’t learn anything from the 
bifurcation of nature except that it should not exist. In that sense, philosophies that 
accept the bifurcation of nature are so many death warrants. 
To use a familiar literary topos, when Sartre’s Roquentin, out of despair, vomits 
on a tree root, he certainly does not realize that the tree, the root, the rhizome have 
exactly the same problem as his: that they too are existential entities and not substances, 
that they are organisms which wage a bet on life in the sense that they have to exist, to 
get out of themselves and apprehend—hence the word prehension, so necessary for 
Whitehead—and that many other beings are necessary for the continuation of their 
existence. A world made of substance and essences, in the way Sartre imagines it to be, 
where only intentional human entities such as Roquentin would have a meaningful 
existence, is indeed a place to detest and desert. Fortunately, it is not the existence of 
humans but existentialism as a doctrine that represents one of the lowest points in the 
abandonment by philosophy of the world as it is known to science and experienced by 
living creatures. 
But, of course, there is no way to abandon existentialism and embrace the sort of 
naturalism produced by the first empiricism by simply adding sequences of matters of 
fact one after another. It is not simply because you turn, for instance, to genes instead of 
Roquentin’s mal de vivre that you understand what is given in experience. It all depends 
on which sort of genes you are turning to.12 If the philosophy of organism had to 
swallow Darwinism, it would require something more than Dawkins’s selfish gene: 
“Objects that we use as standards and signposts, which are elected and stabilized as 
‘what’ we perceive, do not faithfully bear witness to what is nature, but they bear witness 
for nature, thanks to the judicious character of the reason why they have been selected 
in the first place. Judicious and not justified: nature does not explain nor justify 
anything, but it is pragmatically implicated in the consequences that verify or falsify the 
consequences of having chosen this or that signpost, the adequation to this type of 
attention” (132). 
The third part of Stengers’s book is a close commentary on what Whitehead had 
to do in order to be faithful to this intuition that “a subject, or rather a superject, 
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emerges from the world,” instead of, as Kant believed, to have a world emerge out of a 
subject. 
To summarize Stengers’s interpretation of Process and Reality would require a 
commentary as long as her own book is, although—and this is the extraordinary gift of 
the author—the reader may feel, after having read it, that it is the novelty of 
Whitehead’s argument, much more than its intrinsic difficulty, that has caused most of 
the problems we have comprehending him. In the end, the argument seems plain 
enough. And yet, Stengers goes through all the difficulties one by one: subject, superject, 
positive and negative prehension, and this most disturbing of all concepts, the eternal 
objects: “Whitehead will never change his mind on this point: the eternal object cannot 
provide a weapon for any judgment, give a foundation to any argument, grant a 
privilege to any power, communicate with any ‘pure’ experience” (240). 
Most of the problems we have with Whitehead are due to a disrespect for the simplicity 
of his argument and to what he famously called “misplaced concreteness.” We always 
try to translate his metaphysics into what we imagine metaphysics has to deliver: an 
insurance against risk, when it does exactly the opposite. It takes as much risk as the 
experience it tries to describe: “What the reader should always be reminded of is the 
Whiteheadian decision to take the following statement literally: ‘this thing is present in 
my experience in as much as it is present elsewhere as well,’ and to stick to this 
statement no matter how fanciful the consequences to which it leads” (330). 
It would be ridiculous for me to claim that Process and Reality, under Stengers’s 
watch, reads like a novel. And yet it shares, in the end, some of the power of fiction. If 
the bifurcation of nature is impossible, then it means that every entity has to explore 
what, in the rest of the world, may offer it some grasp on life in order for it to continue 
existing. This grasp is intensely objective since it mobilizes so many other entities; but it 
is also intensely subjective, since it represents, like Leibniz’s monads, a very particular 
version of what the world looks like, that is, an interpretation, a bet, a risk taken, a 
confidence shared, a choice. 
This new distribution of the former functions of subject and object is what 
Whitehead calls actual occasion. In his hands, the two arch-modernist concepts of 
subject and object, instead of designating spatial domains of the world, have become 
temporal markers: past (object) and present (subject). Eternal objects are not there, as in 
Plato, to guard the substance against dissolution into appearance but to guard the 
organism against becoming either an isolated atom or a mere cause of something else. 
They are there “to deprive the continuous of its explanatory power” (219). Eternal 
objects are there so that we keep being able to say, “Creativity is what the world is 
about.” Try to take eternal objects out, as so many embarrassed readers would like to, 
and, immediately, Whitehead’s argument becomes another theory of emergence, 
another form of naturalization, or even worse, some type of panpsychism. Stengers is 
right in using Deleuze’s crucial distinction between the potential/real couple and the 
virtual/actual one. Eternal objects protect us against the confusion between the two.13 It 
is because they play no direct role but are present nonetheless that events can play the 
full role. They don’t explain, but they allow the scene of the world to be fully deployed. 
 
I think it is with Whitehead’s God that Stengers’s book reveals its ultimate 
power. Commentators have often tried either to drag Whitehead in theology 
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seminars—forgetting that his God is there to solve very precisely a technical problem of 
philosophy, not of belief—or to get rid of this embarrassing appendix altogether. 
Stengers does not hesitate to go all the way in the direction of Whitehead’s argument: if 
nature can’t be seen as bifurcated, if actual occasions are the stuff out of which the world 
is made, if “negative prehensions” are the only way actual occasions have to envisage 
the world, to apprehend it, if eternal objects are there as guardians against the shift back 
to substance and foundations, then a God-function is implied in this philosophy. 
But, of course, everything now turns around the word implied, or implicated. 
Taken superficially, it shifts the concept of God into one of a king who sits on a throne 
or some great plant ensconced in a sort of flower pot, holding this position in order to 
close a book of metaphysics—the equivalent in philosophy of the Queen of England in 
politics. Or else, taken as a belief, God gives some philosophical luster to parts of the 
creed of some church, becoming what you confide in when you have lost confidence in 
the world and especially in science. Without disregarding those possibilities, Whitehead 
means something else altogether. Implied is not only a logical function—who is less a 
logician than the Whitehead of the famous team “Russell and Whitehead”?—but a 
thoroughly ontological involvement into the world. God is the feeling for positive, 
instead of negative, prehensions. After years (or should I say centuries?) of associating 
God with negativity—think, for instance, of Hegel—it will take some time to see his role 
as consisting of a positivity, but that would be a welcome change! “Divine experience is, 
in that sense, conscious but also incomplete. God does not envisage what could be. His 
existence does not precede nor predict future actualisations. His envisagement comes 
from the thirst for some novelty that this thirst is going to induce but which, by 
definition, will go beyond it” (525). 
In a way, it is not surprising that theology has found Whitehead so congenial, 
since innovations in theology are few and far between. But Stengers redresses the usual 
imbalance and places Whitehead’s invention of a God implicated squarely inside the 
world—and unable to “explicate” it, nor to “extricate” himself out of it—as the most 
daring but also the most indispensable consequence of his early refusal to let nature 
bifurcate. No more than you can choose in nature to eliminate either primary or 
secondary qualities can you choose, in Whitehead, between his epistemology and his 
theology. And, of course, it would be impossible to say that the modernist philosophy 
has “no need for God,” as philosophers are so proud of saying and say frequently. Their 
crossed-out God—to use my term—is always there but only to fill gaps in their 
reasoning. By taking Whitehead’s God as seriously as Whitehead’s epistemology, 
Stengers is leading us in the first systematic attempt at finding a metaphysical alternative 
to modernism. The reason why her attempts are so beautifully moving is that 
Whitehead has a gift of the most extraordinary rarity: he is not a creature of the culture 
of critique. “He knows no critique,” as one could say of a saint “she knows no sin.” 
 
What does it mean to “speak Whiteheadian”? Amusingly, Stengers’s book begins 
with some of those long Whiteheadian sentences that Grendel, the dragon hero of John 
Gardner’s remake of Beowulf, thunders when he wishes to frighten his human victims 
out of their wits. Stengers’s book is a frightening one, no question about that: five 
hundred pages of purely speculative metaphysics. But Grendel, as we learn when we 
read the story, is not there to eat all of us up. On the contrary, he is there to remind us 
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of our lost wisdom. How can it be that America, nay, the Harvard Philosophy 
Department provided a shelter to the most important philosopher of the twentieth 
century and then has utterly forgotten him? Why has it taken us so long to understand 
Grendel’s moaning? Probably because it does not offer the easy grasp of the usual 
domesticated philosophical animals presented in zoos behind bars, always there to be 
inspected and endlessly monitored. Maybe this is what Deleuze meant by “a free and 
wild invention of concepts.” “Wild” does not mean “savage,” but out in the open, as 
when we go searching for some elusive wildlife. 
I have always felt that Whitehead-watching had a lot to do with whale-watching 
as it is practiced, for instance, on the coast of San Diego in the winter. You stay on a 
boat for hours, see nothing, and suddenly, “There she blows, she blows!” and, swiftly the 
whale disappears again. But with Stengers at the helm, the little ship is able to predict 
with great accuracy where the whale will emerge again, in a few hours. Come on board, 
prepare your binoculars, and be confident in the captain’s watch. 
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Book Reviewed: Isabelle Stengers, Penser avec Whitehead: Une libre et sauvage 
création de concepts (Paris: Gallimard, 2002). This work is cited parenthetically. 
 
I thank Lindsay Waters for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this essay. 
1. Because of this long and friendly collaboration, Stengers has been associated with the 
physics of complexity pioneered by Ilya Prigogine. In her own work since, Prigogine’s 
influence is important not because she tried to prolong some more elaborated 
naturalism but because she learned from Prigogine’s experience to which extent 
scientists would go to ignore something as crucial as time. Hence her admiration for 
science and her deep-seated suspicion for its sleight of hand. 
2. From Cosmopolitiques—Tome 1: La Guerre Des Sciences (Paris: La découverte & 
Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1996), to Cosmopolitiques—Tome 7: Pour En Finir 
Avec La Tolérance (Paris: La Découverte-Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1997). 
3. Isabelle Stengers teaches philosophy in Brussels. Only a small part of her works is 
available in English: Power and Invention, with a foreword by Bruno Latour 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); The Invention of Modern Science, 
trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Bernadette 
Bensaude-Vincent and Isabelle Stengers, A History of Chemistry, trans. Deborah Van 
Dam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Leon Chertock and 
Isabelle Stengers, A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason: Hypnosis as a Scientific 
Problem from Lavoisier to Lacan, trans. Martha Noel Evans (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1992). I have attempted to present Stengers’s epistemological principle 
in “How to Talk About the Body? The Normative Dimension of Science Studies,” in 
Part 3: Body Collective of “Bodies on Trial,” ed. Marc Berg and Madeleine Akrich, 
special issue, Body and Society 10, no. 2–3 (June–September 2004): 205–29. 
4. The choice of the subtitle is even more bizarre, since on page 307 Stengers reveals a 
clear contrast between the positivity of Whitehead and the exaggerated tropism of 
Deleuze for chaos and organicism. 
5. “It is because William James has refused to give to reflexive consciousness and to its 
pretensions to invariance, the privilege to occupy the center of the scene, that James has 
explicated so well [for Whitehead] what human experience requests from metaphysics, 
and more precisely, to what it requests metaphysics to resist” (230). Far from 
psychologizing everything, Whitehead sees in James—and especially in his celebrated 
essay on consciousness—the thinker who has ended all the pretensions of the mind. If 
the “actual occasion” is depsychologized, it is thanks to James. 
6. Here is a standard definition of the problem: “However, we must admit that the 
causality theory of nature has its strong suit. The reason why the bifurcation of nature is 
always creeping back into scientific philosophy is the extreme difficulty of exhibiting the 
perceived redness and warmth of the fire in one system of relations with the agitated 
molecules of carbon and oxygen with the radiant energy from them, and with the 
various functioning of the material body. Unless we produce the all-embracing relations, 
we are faced with a bifurcated nature; namely, warmth and redness on one side, and 
molecules, electrons and ether on the other side. Then the two factors are explained as 
being respectively the cause and the mind’s reaction to the cause” (Alfred North 
Whitehead, The Concept of Nature [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920], 
32). 
93-Review Stengers      12 
7. On the political dimension of this divide, see my own footnote on Whitehead’s 
argument in Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. 
Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
8. Gabriel Tarde, one of the (forgotten) founders of sociology, and, like Whitehead, a 
decisive influence on Deleuze, called “societies” what is called here “organisms,” but 
with very much the same argument. Witness his slogan “Exister c’est différer.” See his 
Monadologie et Sociologie, réédition (Paris: Les empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1999). 
One of his most original book lives again on the Web: G. Tarde, Social Laws: An 
Outline of Sociology (1899), trans. Howard C. Warren (Kitchener, Ont.: Batoche 
Books, 2000), available at 
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/tarde/laws.pdf. 
9. On the difference between the two, see my own attempt, “Why Has Critique Run 
Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” in “The Future of 
Criticism—A Critical Inquiry Symposium,” special issue, Critical Inquiry 30, no. 2 
(2004): 225–48. 
10. A colleague of Stengers, another Belgium philosopher, Vinciane Despret, has 
developped empirically in great detail this crucial insight. See her books, Ces Émotions 
qui nous fabriquent: Ethnopsychologie de l’authenticité (Paris: Les empêcheurs de 
penser en rond, 1999); and Quand le loup habitera avec l’agneau (Paris: Les 
Empêcheurs, 2002). 
11. For a nice but totally derivative rehashing of the same old arguments, see James 
Robert Brown, Who Rules in Science? An Opinionated Guide to the Wars (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
12. See the small but marvelous book written by Stengers and a dissident biologist, 
Pierre Sonigo, L’évolution, Collection Mot à Mot (Les Ulis, France: EDP Sciences, 
2003). 
13. If you realize a potential, nothing really happens, since “everything was already 
there in potentia.” If you actualize virtualities, it is only retrospectively, because of the 
radically new event of the actual occasion that the real can be seen as what has emerged 
out of what was possible. On this distinction, see François Zourabichvili, Le Vocabulaire 
De Deleuze (Paris: Ellipses, 2003). 
 
